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STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I . Whether defendant's fai lure to object at tr ia l to 
the jury instructions precludes him from now challenging the 
instructions. 
II . Whether the tr ia l court properly exercised i t s 
discretion in refusing defendant's challenge for cause as to two 
veniremen who did not have such "strong and deep impressions" as 
would impair their impartiality. 
III . Whether the prosecutor in closing argument was 
jus t i f i ed in discussing the inferences arising from testimony 
e l i c i t e d by defendant. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
None disposi t ive . 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint i f f -Respondent , 
- v -
ROBERT EUGENE JONES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19533 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant, Robert E. Jones, was charged with first-
degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and aggravated 
burglary in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 (1978), 76-5-
202 (Supp. 1983), 76-6-203 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of the charged offenses in a 
jury trial held August 29-31 and September 1-2, 6-7, 1983, in the 
Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, presiding. At the 
penalty phase, defendant waived the jury. Defendant was 
sentenced by Judge Hyde on September 15, 1983 to life 
imprisonment. 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
On March 11, 1983, at approximately 11:00 p.m., 
defendant shot and killed Kim Chapman and seriously wounded 
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Beverly Olson1 in the basement of the Earl Chapman home in Ogden, 
Utah (R. 598-599, 618-622, 831-838, 961-964, 969-998) . Kim 
Chapman was shot twice at c l o s e range, f i r s t to the chest and 
second t o the forehead (R. 599, 650, 678, 748, 795-798, 808-822, 
1415) . 
Defendant met Beverly in January of 1981, more than a 
year after the death of Bever ly 1 s f i r s t husband (R. 839-844, 
1238) . In March of 1981, Beverly purchased the house next door 
t o the house where defendant's parents l i v e d , and defendant moved 
in with Beverly (R. 826-827, 847-850, 1017, 1021, 1250-1251) . On 
the advice of defendant's parents , Beverly refused to marry 
defendant, who was twice-divorced (R. 863-864, 1053) . 
Over the next year and a hal f , the ir r e l a t i o n s h i p was 
severe ly s tra ined by problems r e s u l t i n g from defendant's sexual 
impotence and h i s i n a b i l i t y t o hold a job (R. 861-863, 882-883, 
885, 1054, 1255-1256, 1296, 1489) . F i n a l l y , in October of 1982, 
Beverly completely severed the r e l a t i o n s h i p and kicked defendant 
out of her house for good (R. 827-828, 881, 1018, 1022, 1307, 
1310) . Defendant moved in with h i s parents next door (R. 895) . 
Beverly met Kim Chapman in mid-November of 1982, and 
they began dating regular ly (R. 826, 912-914) . By mid-December 
Kim and Beverly began ta lk ing of marriage, but they had t o wait 
for Kim's divorce from h i s f i r s t wife to become f i n a l (R. 601-
605, 915-916? t 
$• 
1
 Beverly Olson married Dale Olson short ly before defendant's 
t r i a l (R. 825, 840, 851) . She was formerly known as Beverly 
Jones as a r e s u l t of her f i r s t marriage but i s not re la ted to 
defendant by that marriage (R. 825, 839-841) . To avoid 
confusion, she here inafter w i l l be referred t o by her given name. 
- 2 -
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During this period of time, defendant began to threaten 
Beverly with physical harm, regularly yelling at her from next 
door: "I'm going to kill you, bitch" (R. 828-829). On one 
occasion defendant came after Beverly with a two-by-four and then 
followed her into her house and grabbed a knife from a kitchen 
drawer before his father came to restrain him (R. 902-903). Over 
the next few months, police officers were called on six occasions 
in connection with incidents of threats and violence involving 
defendant and Beverly (R. 886-887, 924-925, 948, 1430-1431, 
1467). 
In December of 1982, defendant told Debbie All red, 
Beverly's sister, who was living with Beverly at the time, that 
"there is going to be real trouble. I mean real .38 trouble." 
Defendant then motioned with his hand like a gun (R. 1493-1494). 
In early February of 1983, defendant told his ex-wife Chris 
Norvall that he and Beverly had broken up and that Beverly was 
planning to marry someone else (R. 1479-1480). Defendant then 
said, "What I ought to do is rape the bitch and shoot her 
boyfriend" (R. 1480, 1488). 
On February 16 , 1983, defendant broke i n t o B e v e r l y ' s 
house , a s s a u l t e d her and t o l d her t h a t he was going t o "blow her 
head off" and then w a i t for Kim and "blow h i s head off" (R. 830-
831) . The next day, f e a r i n g for her own s a f e t y , Beverly moved 
i n t o t h e Chapman home with her two c h i l d r e n (R. 607, 8 3 1 , 942-
943) . For the next few weeks, Beverly and her c h i l d r e n spent 
n i g h t s i n t h e gues t bedroom in t h e basement, and Kim s l e p t in t h e 
o ther basement bedroom (R. 597, 607, 944) . Because Beverly took 
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only overnight necessities to the Chapmans1 house, she usually 
went home to get clothing in the morning after taking her 
children to school and before going to work (R. 607-609, 944-
946). 
Between February 17 and March 11, 1983, defendant 
followed Beverly and watched the Chapman home constantly (R. 831, 
956, 1333-1334, 1444-1445). On March 10, 1983, defendant broke 
into Beverly's house and sat on her bed smoking cigarettes and 
drinking beer, angrily waiting for her to make her customary 
morning stop at her house (R. 1433-1436). When Beverly did not 
come, defendant went home, leaving a piece of rope tied to the 
headboard of Beverly1s bed (R. 1436). The rope was knotted with 
a special loop that could be quickly cinched tight (R. 1435) . 
On March 11, 1983, at approximately 10:00 p.m., 
defendant entered the Chapman home through a side door from the 
carport, using a hidden key he had earlier discovered (R. 1383, 
1386, 1454). Defendant had been watching the Chapman home for 
several hours and knew that no one was home (R. 1361-1381). 
Defendant walked downstairs to the basement, and when he heard 
Mr. and Mrs. Chapman come home followed by Kim, Beverly and 
Beverly1s children, defendant hid in the basement storage room 
(R. 597-598, 831, 951, 1388). Beverly put her children to bed, 
and then she and Kim watched a basketball game on the television 
in the basement family room while Mr. and Mrs. Chapman retired to 
bed upstairs (R. 598, 616-618, 831-832, 951-952, 956-958, 1390-
1391). 
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Forty minutes later, defendant came out of the closet 
brandishing a pistol and saying that he was going to kill them so 
that Beverly could not marry Kim (R. 833-834, 961, 969-973, 
1396). From his pocket defendant took out a piece of rope tied 
with the same special loop that was found in the rope he had left 
tied to the headboard of Beverly's bed the day before (R. 834, 
1403, 1435). Defendant told Beverly to tie up Kim with the rope, 
but Beverly was unable to do so because she was unfamiliar with 
the special knots (R. 834, 973, 1402, 1403). Defendant then used 
his pocket knife to cut the electrical cord from the Atari video 
game by the television and told Beverly to use it to tie up Kim, 
but Beverly was again unsuccessful because the cord kept slipping 
(R. 834-835, 973-976, 1404-1406). 
Defendant, still holding the gun, then moved toward and 
opened the back door that opened out onto the back porch (R. 835-
836, 979-985, 1409-1410). Kim followed defendant to the door 
trying to talk defendant out of using the gun while Beverly 
remained in the middle of the room (R. 836-837, 980-981). As Kim 
reached out and touched defendant's wrists, defendant shot Kim in 
the chest (R. 836-837, 985, 997-998). Defendant then shot 
Beverly in her left palm as she instinctively threw up her hands 
to protect her head (R. 837, 985-987). Beverly turned away and 
buried her head and was shot again the back (R. 837, 987-988). 
Beverly heard one more shot then turned around to see defendant 
exit through the back door (R. 838, 988-989). 
Earl Chapman, who had awoken moments earlier, started 
downstairs after hearing the gunshots and yelled to Beverly, who 
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responded, "It's him? itfs him. Call the police." (R. 599, 619-
622, 838, 991). Mr. Chapman continued down the stairs and in the 
basement saw that Beverly was wounded and that his son had been 
shot in the head (R. 599, 623-625). Mr. Chapman went back 
upstairs to telephone the police (R. 599, 625). 
At approximately midnight on March 11, 1983, while 
running through the streets about one mile from the Chapman home, 
defendant saw Officer Terry Shaw, a Deputy Sheriff for Weber 
County, park his patrol car in front of his home (R. 6 95-6 96, 
701-702, 1418). Defendant knocked on the door of Shaw's house 
and asked if Shaw was a police officer. Shaw replied that he 
was. Defendant then put his hands on his head and said, "I think 
I just killed someone" (R. 696-697, 704-705, 710, 1419). 
Shaw told defendant to sit on the porch while he 
telephoned police dispatch (R. 697, 705). When Shaw went back 
outside, defendant lay face down on Shaw's lawn (R. 698, 708-709, 
1419). Officer Nathan Webster of the Ogden City Police 
Department arrived within a few minutes and upon seeing that 
defendant was "spaced out" and incoherent—defendant had taken a 
capsule of synthetic "speed" earlier that day—had paramedics 
come examine defendant, but the paramedics .found nothing wrong 
with defendant (R. 699, 709, 712-713, 722-727, 1370). Officer 
Webster transported defendant to the county jail (R. 709, 713, 
723). 
Officer Webster interviewed defendant at the jail after 
advising defendant of his rights (R. 715, 728). Defendant 
volunteered that he had gone to the Chapman home and claimed that 
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he had not gone in but had argued with Kim and Beverly on the 
back porch (R. 716-717, 734-736, 1464) . Defendant said that Kim 
had made a move toward him and that he, defendant, had drawn h i s 
kni fe in s e l f - d e f e n s e but did not have to use i t because there 
was no f i g h t or contact (R. 717, 736-737) . 
Defendant a l so gave a sworn statement to Detect ive 
Norman Soakai of the Ogden City Pol ice Department (R. 1422) . 
Defendant t o l d Detect ive Soakai that Kim grabbed defendant by the 
sweater and shoved him backwards i n t o a door jamb, bruis ing 
defendant's back (R. 1438, 1465-1466). Defendant did not t e l l 
Detec t ive Soakai that Kim came at him with a gun and again 
claimed that he, defendant, had drawn only h i s knife in the 
confrontat ion (R. 1465-1466) . Although defendant claimed he put 
h i s knife back in h i s sheath as he l e f t the Chapman home, he was 
not carrying a knife when arres ted , and the knife was never found 
(R. 698, 710, 717, 739-740, 1458, 1466, 1474) . 
At t r i a l , defendant admitted that he had broken in to 
the Chapman home a t approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 1 1 , 1983, 
had hidden in the storage room for forty minutes before 
confronting Beverly and Kim, and had ordered Beverly t o t i e up 
Kim with the rope and the cord, which Beverly was unable to do 
(R. 1383-1406, 1454, 1457) . But defendant claimed that as he 
moved toward the back door of the basement t o l e a v e , Kim suddenly 
stuck a gun in defendant's back (R. 1408-1412). Defendant a l s o 
claimed that he and Kim struggled over the gun and that as they 
struggled Beverly struck him on the back with the f i r e p l a c e 
poker, bruis ing defendant's back (R. 1415-1416) . F i n a l l y , 
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I 
defendant claimed that the gun discharged during the s truggle and 
that he remembered l a s t seeing the gun on the f loor next to Kim's 
body (R. 1414-1417) . 
Howeverr Earl Chapmanr who reached the basement only 
moments after defendant ran out the back doorf t e s t i f i e d that Kim 
did not own a gun and tha t there was no gun on the f loor next t o 
Kim1s body immediately after the shooting (R. 629, 1501, 1504) . 
Of f i cers Rudy VanBeekum and Gale Bowcutt of the Ogden City Pol ice 
Department, who i n v e s t i g a t e d the murder scene f t e s t i f i e d that 
there was no evidence of a s truggle (R. 657r 682) , and Officer 
VanBeekum t e s t i f i e d that no weapons were found a t the scene (R. 
663-664) . 
The physical evidence a l s o contradicted defendant's 
vers ion of the events in the Chapman basement. Defendant claimed 
that Kim held the gun in h i s r ight hand (R. 1410-1414, 1535) . 
However, the f i r s t b u l l e t entered Kim's r ight chest area j u s t 
below the pectoral muscles, and the l a s t b u l l e t entered Kim's 
l e f t forehead and trave led downward across h i s brain, lodging in 
the back of the other s ide of Kim's head (R. 808-810, 815, 819, 
822, 1461) . Kim was the same height as defendant (R. 1462) , and 
Beverly t e s t i f i e d that Kim sunk t o the f loor af ter the f i r s t shot 
t o h i s chest (R. 837) . 
Also, defendant t e s t i f i e d tha t Beverly came over by the 
back door and h i t him with the poker as he and Kim struggled and 
t h a t she was wounded when the gun discharged during the s truggle 
(R. 1414-1416) . However, sp la t tered blood from Bever ly ' s wounds 
was found over by the f i r e p l a c e , not by the back door (R. 676-
677, 1612) . 
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The murder weapon eventual ly was located a t a loca l 
pawn shop but could not be t i e d d i r e c t l y to defendant (R. 747-
750, 824-825)• Howeverf defendant admitted that the murder 
weapon was one of two .38 handguns that he had purchased in 1982 
but claimed that he had given one to Beverly and sold the other 
t o h i s parents (R. 1293-1294, 1308, 1313, 1350-1351). Beverly 
t e s t i f i e d that although she had carried one of the . 3 8 f s on a 
hunting t r i p with defendant, the guns belonged to defendant and 
he had taken them with him when he moved out of Bever ly ' s house 
(R. 872-881, 958-961) . 
The jury found defendant g u i l t y of f i r s t - d e g r e e murder, 
attempted f i r s t - d e g r e e murder and aggravated burglary (R. 1616-
1618) . At the sentencing hearing held September 15 , 1983, 
defendant waived the jury and was sentenced t o l i f e imprisonment 
on the f i r s t - d e g r e e murder convic t ion , and on September 16, 1983, 
defendant was sentenced to serve f i v e years t o l i f e a t the Utah 
State Prison for both the attempted f i r s t - d e g r e e murder and 
aggravated burglary conv ic t ions , the sentences t o run 
concurrently (R. 149-151, 161-164, 170 ) . Defendant appeals these 
conv ic t ions . 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS " 
Point I . Defendant i s precluded from chal lenging on 
appeal the jury ins t ruc t ions because he f a i l e d to object thereto 
a t t r i a l . In any event, the f i r s t - d e g r e e murder "element" 
i n s t r u c t i o n s properly conjoined the in ten t element with both the 
homicide and aggravating circumstance elements. Any error was 
cured by the accompanying i n s t r u c t i o n s and was rendered harmless 
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because the second a l t e r n a t i v e aggravating circumstance was 
s a t i s f i e d and because under the f a c t s of t h i s case f the jury 
could not have found that defendant i n t e n t i o n a l l y caused Kim 
Chapman's death and a l s o have found that he only a c c i d e n t a l l y 
created a great risk of death to Beverly . 
Defendant's challenge to the second-degree murder 
"element" instructions does not merit reversal because the 
evidence overwhelmingly supports defendant's convictions of 
first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. Finally, 
the trial court did instruct the jury regarding the State's 
burden of proof. 
Point I I . The t r i a l court properly exerc ised i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n i n refusing defendant's chal lenge for cause as t o two 
prospect ive jurors because neither harbored such "strong and deep 
impressions" as would c l o s e the i r minds aga ins t or combat any 
opposi te test imony. Furthermore, one venireman knew none of the 
w i tnes se s and the other was merely acquainted with S t a t e ' s 
wi tness Earl Chapman. 
Point I I I . The prosecutor in c lo s ing argument properly 
discussed and analyzed the evidence and the inferences and 
deductions a r i s i n g therefrom. The jurors were j u s t i f i e d in 
considering evidence of defendant's mental i l l n e s s h i s tory and 
charges of harassment because defendant himself e l i c i t e d 
testimony r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o . F i n a l l y , the jury could not have 
been improperly influenced by the prosecutor ' s remarks, and the 
evidence was not so c l o s e as t o warrant a heightened scrut iny of 
the prosecutor ' s c l o s i n g argument. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSES 
CHARGED AND THE STATE1S BURDEN OF PROOF. 
Defendant chal lenges the t r i a l c o u r t ' s "element'1 
i n s t r u c t i o n s on f i r s t - d e g r e e murder and attempted f i r s t - d e g r e e 
murder ( Ins truct ions Nos. 14 and 22) ISJSS. Addendum/ Appendix 
"A"], claiming that these i n s t r u c t i o n s f a i l e d to properly conjoin 
the in tent element with both the homicide and aggravating factor 
elements. Defendant a l so chal lenges the "element" i n s t r u c t i o n s 
on second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder 
( Ins truct ions Nos. 17 and 24) [£££ Addendum, Appendix "A"] on the 
grounds that they miss tate the law. F i n a l l y , defendant claims 
that the t r i a l court f a i l e d t o in s t ruc t the jury properly 
regarding the S t a t e ' s burden of proof. 
Defendant did not r a i s e these objec t ions t o the 
i n s t r u c t i o n s a t t r i a l . Thus, defendant i s precluded from now 
chal lenging the jury i n s t r u c t i o n s unless necessary t o avoid 
manifest i n j u s t i c e . Rule 19 , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-19 (c) (1982); State v- Malmrose. Utah, 
649 P.2d 56 (1982) . This Court's affirmance of defendant's 
convic t ions on t h i s ground w i l l not r e s u l t in manifest i n j u s t i c e 
because none of the a l l eged errors in the i n s t r u c t i o n s merit 
r eversa l . 
Defendant chal lenges the "element" i n s t r u c t i o n s on 
f i r s t - d e g r e e murder and attempted f i r s t - d e g r e e murder 
( Ins truct ions Nos. 14 and 22) on the grounds that the intent 
i 
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element was not repeated in connection with the the first of the 
two alternate aggravating circumstances. The first alternative 
aggravating circumstance was that defendant must have "created a 
great risk of death to a person other than the victim and the 
defendant" (R. 101, 109). [See Addendumf Appendix "A."l The 
second alternative aggravating circumstance was that the homicide 
must have been committed or attempted in connection with an 
aggravated burglary or burglary (R. 101, 109). [£&£ Addendum, 
Appendix "A."] 
Defendant claims that the trial court's failure to 
repeat the scienter element in its statement of the first 
alternative aggravating circumstance contravened Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202(c) (Supp. 1983), which includes the word "knowingly" 
in its statement of this aggravating circumstance, and allowed 
the jury to convict defendant of first-degree murder and 
attempted first-degree murder even if the jury found or believed 
that defendant unknowingly created a risk of death to Beverly. 
This claim fails on several grounds. 
First, the jury could not have misunderstood that the 
"intentionally or knowingly" element, subsection (2) of the 
charge, applied equally to both subsection (3), the homicide 
element, and subsection (4) the aggravating circumstances 
element. Jury instructions are not to be considered in isolation 
but are to be viewed as a whole, state v. Reuben, Utah, 663 P.2d 
445 (1983). Instruction No. 13, which immediately preceded the 
first-degree murder "element" instruction, tracked the language 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1983), and included the word 
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"knowingly" in the "great risk of death" aggravating circumstance 
(R. 100). [£££ Addendum, Appendix "A."l The trial court also 
instructed the jury that there must be a "union or joint 
operation of act and intent" (R. 87) (Instruction No. 2), and 
that the elements of first-degree murder are in the conjunctive 
(R. 119) (Instruction No. 31). Finally, the trial court included 
definitions of the terms "intentionally" and "knowingly" (R. 98) 
(Instruction No. 12). Thus, the instructions as a whole 
adequately informed the jury of the intent element. See State v 
J2QJCJ1F Utah, 585 P.2d 56 (1978) (absence of intent element in 
"element" instruction harmless in light of inclusion of 
instructions defining "intentionally" and containing proper 
statutory language). 
The cases cited in defendant's brief on this point. 
People Vt Hardin, 607 p.2d 1291 (Colo. 1980); People Vt Martinez, 
634 P.2d 26 (Colo. 1981); Ramisky v. Ketchikan, 633 P.2d 303 
(Alaska 1981); State v. Laine, Utah, 618 P.2d 33 (1980), are not 
on point because in each of these cases the trial court failed to 
include any reference to the intent element in the "element" 
instruction. In the instant case, the intent element was 
included. 
Defendant also cites State v. Laine. Utah, 618 P.2d 33 
(1980), in support of his claim that the inclusion of an 
instruction correctly quoting the pertinent statute cannot cure 
any defect in the "element" instruction. However, this Court in 
Laine, after concluding that the defective instruction had not 
been cured by the "Information" instruction that case, explained: 
-13-
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In holding the instructions here to 
be fatally defective, we do not mean to 
imply that all of the elements of the 
charged crime must necessarily be 
contained in one instruction, though 
the better practice is, we think, to 
do so. So long as the jury is informed 
what each element is and that each must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the instructions taken as a whole may 
be adequate even though the essential 
elements are found in more than one 
instruction. 
618 P.2d at 35 (emphasis in original). 
In the case at bar, the t r i a l court ins tructed the jury 
that the S ta te had "the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt a l l of the elements of the crimes charged, which elements 
are s e t forth in the fo l lowing ins truc t ions" (R. 95) ( Ins truct ion 
No. 9 ) . Because the jury was subsequently f u l l y ins tructed 
regarding the d e f i n i t i o n and elements of f i r s t - d e g r e e murder (R. 
100-101) ( Ins truct ions Nos. 13 and 14) T.SJEL£ Addendum, Appendix 
"A"], the jury was informed of each element and that each must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In any event , any defect as a 
r e s u l t of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o repeat the word 
"knowingly" in the "great r isk of death" aggravating circumstance 
i s merely a subt l e technica l i n s u f f i c i e n c y that i n l i g h t of the 
weight of evidence of defendant's g u i l t does not r i s e to the 
l e v e l of p la in error . See Chambers v. People f 682 P.2d 1173, 
1179 (Colo. 1984) (En banc) . 
Moreover, defendant's chal lenge to Ins truc t ions Nos. 14 
and 22 must f a i l because the jury returned a separate verd ic t of 
g u i l t y for the offense of aggravated burglary (R. 1618) . Thus, 
the second a l t e r n a t i v e aggravating circumstance was s a t i s f i e d , 
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and any technical error in the language of the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e 
aggravating circumstance does not require reversal of defendant's 
convic t ions because the record c l e a r l y reveals that the jury did 
not re ly e x c l u s i v e l y on the a l l eged ly erroneous prong* S££ Zant 
v . Stephens, U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 2733 (1983); Stromberg V, 
Ca l i forn ia , 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931). 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , defendant does not chal lenge e i ther the aggravated 
burglary convict ion or the the second a l t e r n a t i v e aggravating 
circumstance charge. 
F i n a l l y , under the f a c t s adduced a t t r i a l , the jury 
could not poss ib ly have convicted defendant of f i r s t - d e g r e e 
murder and attempted f i r s t - d e g r e e murder on the erroneous 
assumption that in tent or knowledge was required with respect to 
Kim Chapman's death but not with respect t o Bever ly ' s risk of 
death. Bever ly ' s testimony regarding defendant's conduct in the 
Chapman basement gave r i s e to the necessary inference that 
defendant i n t e n t i o n a l l y caused Kim's death and knowingly created 
a great risk of death to her. Defendant's vers ion of the 
inc ident refuted the inference of in tent on both counts by 
claiming that both Kim's death and Bever ly ' s i n j u r i e s were 
a c c i d e n t a l . Thus, the record revea l s no bas i s upon which the 
jury could f ind that defendant i n t e n t i o n a l l y caused Kim's death 
but only a c c i d e n t a l l y created a great risk of death to Beverly, 
and therefore the only rat ional inference to be drawn from the 
j u r y ' s verd ic t of g u i l t y i s that they applied the intent element 
to both the elements of Kim's death and Bever ly ' s r isk of death, 
i f they reached the "risk of death" aggravating circumstance a t 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
all. Under these circumstances, reversal is not warranted 
because there is no reasonable likelihood of a different result 
i 
in the absence of the a l l eged error . £££ State v . Fontana, Utahf 
680 P.2d 1042 (1984); S ta te v. Montague. Utah, 671 P.2d 187 
(1983) . 
Defendant next chal lenges the "element" i n s t r u c t i o n s on 
second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder 
( Ins truct ions Nos. 17 and 2 4 ) , claiming that these i n s t r u c t i o n s 
miss ta te the law. Any error in these second-degree murder 
i n s t r u c t i o n s does not warrant reversal because the evidence 
overwhelmingly supported defendant's convic t ion of f i r s t - d e g r e e 
murder and attempted f i r s t - d e g r e e murder. £££ State v» Fontana. 
Utah, 680 P.2d 1042 (1984) (where evidence overwhelmingly 
supports conv ic t ion under one v a r i a t i o n of crime submitted t o 
jury f reversal of convic t ion i s not necessary even i f there were 
erroneous i n s t r u c t i o n s on another v a r i a t i o n ) ; accord State v . 
F isher . Utah, 680 P.2d 35 (1984). 
F i n a l l y , defendant's claim that the t r i a l court 
inadequately ins tructed the jury regarding the S t a t e ' s burden of 
proof i s unfounded. The t r i a l court ins tructed the jury that 
defendant was presumed innocent u n t i l proven g u i l t y beyond a 
reasonable doubt (R. 88) ( Ins truct ion No. 3 ) , defined "reasonable 
doubt" (R. 89) ( Ins truct ion No. 4 ) , and informed the jury that i f 
they enterta ined a reasonable doubt as t o defendant's g u i l t they 
must acqui t him and that they could convict defendant only upon 
an "abiding conv ic t ion of the defendant's g u i l t " (R. 90) 
( Ins truct ion No. 5 ) . The court further ins tructed the jury that 
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f a c t s supporting an inference of d e f e n d a n t s g u i l t must a l so be 
e s tab l i shed beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 92) ( Instruct ion No. 
7 ) , charged the jury that defendant's plea of not g u i l t y cast 
upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
a l l the elements of the crime charged (R. 95) ( Instruct ion No. 
9 ) , and reminded the jury in the "element" i n s t r u c t i o n s that each 
element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before defendant 
could be convicted and that i f any element was not so proven the 
jury was required t o acquit defendant (R. 101 , 104, 107, 109, 
111 , 113 , 116, 118) ( Ins truct ions Nos. 14 , 17, 20, 22 , 24 , 26, 
28, 3 0 ) . The i n s t r u c t i o n s referred repeatedly to the S t a t e f s 
having the burden t o e s t a b l i s h defendant's g u i l t (R. 102, 105, 
110, 112, 117, 123) ( Ins truct ions Nos. 1 5 , 18 , 2 3 , 25 , 29 , 3 5 ) , 
and informed the jury that defendant had no burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted in s e l f -de fense (R. 123) 
( Instruct ion No. 3 5 ) . Thus, the t r i a l court i n i t s in s t ruc t ions 
t o the jury s p e c i f i c a l l y addressed and adequately defined the 
S t a t e ' s burden to prove defendant's g u i l t beyond a reasonable 
doubt. That t h i s information was not a l l contained in a s i n g l e 
i n s t r u c t i o n i s immaterial because jury i n s t r u c t i o n s are to be 
considered as a whole and not individual ly . . State v . Reuben, 
Utah, 663 P.2d 445 (1983) . 
Therefore, defendant's chal lenges t o the jury 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , ra ised for the f i r s t time on appeal, do not merit 
reversal of h i s conv ic t ions . 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE 
AS TO TWO VENIREMEN. 
Defendant claims on appeal that the t r i a l court 
committed revers ib l e error by refusing to excuse for cause 
prospect ive jurors Kathy Opheikens and Barbara Shepherd. 
Although i t i s we l l e s tab l s ihed that i t i s pre judic ia l error to 
compel a party t o exerc i se a peremptory chal lenge to remove a 
venireman who should have been excused for cause after the 
venireman expressed bias and concern about whether he or she 
could remain impart ia l f S tate v. Laceyf Utah, 665 P.2d 1311 
(1983); S ta te v. Malmrose. Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982) , only "strong 
and deep impressions" of a venireman that w i l l "close the mind 
against the testimony that may be offered in opposi t ion to them" 
may serve as a b a s i s for d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n for cause. State v. 
fieSLLttr Utah, 689 P.2d 22, 25 (1984) , c i t i n g State v . Bai ley , 
Utah, 605 P.2d 765, 767 (1980)• The determination of the degree 
of p a r t i a l i t y or "impressions" required for d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n for 
cause in a part icular case r e s t s l arge ly within the d i s c r e t i o n of 
the t r i a l court . LaCfi^ r 665 P.2d a t 1312; State v . Brooks, Utah, 
631 P.2d 878 (1981). 
In the ins tant case , the t r i a l court did not abuse i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n in refusing d e f e n d a n t s chal lenge for cause as to 
prospect ive jurors Opheikens and Shepherd. The record revea l s 
that nei ther harbored such "strong and deep impressions" as would 
c l o s e t h e i r minds against or combat any testimony tending t o 
exculpate defendant. 
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During genera l voir d i r e , the t r i a l intuit asked whether 
ui the panel wan acqua in ted witii I-JUT, 1 the .State1?. |n |»ose 
l e s s e s Mi I'M I I'L uspect iv i1 IIJIIIUI h «=i 1.11 y upht J kens reupundt 
t h a t > < ,e- Karl Chapman, the d e c e d e n t ' s f a t h e r , having 
r i l l in IK III In > i i in in in I mi i f i q l i l i i i i i I n - i l l in mi m l l l i in in in 1 1 1 m l I i:< in in I III i i l l 
school " i s d a u g h t e r s , and that she1 had t a lked with Mi 
Chapman a t M "iewinq of the v i c t i m ' s body !R« 451-452) . 
Becaiii! Il in I in i II in Il II in"" I • i II in I ' l iiii I I n i I i j | i 11 it in in ' i 1 i n f i t v c i <J I 
was 'merely acquainted with Kail Chapman, Ms. Opheikens s t a t e d 
t h a t th i s IJ cui mi in J i nt ance would in ill iilfocl hi i i m p a r t i a l i t y as a 
j u r o r (R, 45 V I, 1 See Addendumr Appendix "liL ", I 
During ind iv idua l voi r d i r e , Ms, Opheikens expla ined 
i mi */ in i n | i d III1 m i ' i i r i i i i p j i i . j i ! ,, |.i i j y II I n I ill ill i.'hapnicin 
daughte * ust sa id how hard it WLI ., diiinl Hi nw the basement was in, 
n.r-i . - . - j - people - - ^ • - -- > - oar- * u| i, 
11 Ml . 
Kens , i. \ ' n t i " A.* --• Chapman family 
Addend; 1 
-• -w- niei ida, M ~— * J ^ Mn Opheikens 
u n h e s i t a t i n g c t : i - c i * >..r d e sp i t ? *; a s s o c i a t i o n she c >,.d 
view 
the*, * i _ might *. a . y w ^* 
** ti.->-cr m response defendant *>j-t 
t 
t o prove h i s innocence pon th* * . , 
e x p l a n a t i o n c4 ^resumption > * defendant nnocence sK* 
i e 
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court determined that she was q u a l i f i e d (R. 546-54 8) • [See 
Addendum, Appendix "B."] 
Prospect ive juror Barbara Shepherd revealed upon 
indiv idual vo ir dire that she worked with Cheryl Chapman, the 
wi fe of Kim Chapman's brother, but s ta ted that they had not 
d iscussed the case and that she could judge the matter s o l e l y on 
the evidence presented a t t r i a l (R. 524-525) . Ms. Shepherd a l s o 
s ta ted that she preferred not t o view photographs of the 
decedent 's bodyf that she hoped that i f she were chosen as a 
juror she wouldn't f e e l ob l igated to expla in her verd ic t to her 
co-worker, Cheryl Chapmanf and that she preferred not to serve on 
the jury (R. 528r 530) . [&e& Addendum, Appendix "B."] 
Defendant challenged for cause both Ms. Opheikens and 
Ms. Shepherd, but the t r i a l court refused to d i squa l i fy them (R. 
530, 549, 570-571) . fSee Addendum, Appendix "B."] Defendant 
exerc i sed two peremtory chal lenges against Ms. Opheikens and Ms. 
Shepherd in the course of u t i l i z i n g a l l of h i s peremtory 
chal lenges (R. 135-137) . 
The f a c t s of t h i s case with respect t o prospect ive 
juror Opheikens are s imilar t o those in State v. Lacy. Utah 665 
P.2d 1311 (1983) . In JLa£££r a venireman revealed that he was 
acquainted with two prosecution wi tnes ses and s t a t e d , when 
pressed, that there was a " p o s s i b i l i t y " he might at tach more 
c r e d i b i l i t y t o h i s acquaintances1 testimony than t o the testimony 
of s trangers . This Court affirmed the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f inding that 
t h i s venireman was not so biased as to warrant d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n 
for cause. In support of that ru l ing , t h i s Court noted that the 
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c r e d i b i l i t y of the prosecution wi tnesses with whom the venireman 
was acquainted was not questioned and that the ir testimony was 
not crucia l to the S t a t e ' s case . i d . at 1312. 
In the case at barr prospect ive juror Opheikens s tated 
that she was merely acquainted with S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s , Earl Chapman 
(R. 452) . The t r i a l court determined that she was q u a l i f i e d as a 
juror (R. 5 4 8 ) . Because Earl Chapman's c r e d i b i l i t y was not 
challenged at t r i a l and h i s testimony was not cruc ia l t o the 
S t a t e ' s case—his testimony was corroborated by the testimony of 
Beverly, i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r s VanBeekum and Bowcuttf and to a 
cer ta in extent defendant himself—the t r i a l c o u r t ' s leaving 
prospect ive juror Opheikens on the panel was not error. 
Even more s t r ik ing are the f a c t s of Grizz le v . S t a t e , 
559 P.2d 474 (Okl. Cr. 1977) . In Gr izz l e , the prospect ive juror 
had fol lowed the development of the case in d e t a i l , her chi ldren 
knew the v i c t i m ' s family, and she had attended the v i c t i m ' s 
funeral . Because the prospect ive juror had repeatedly s tated 
that she could maintain an unbiased p o s i t i o n , the court found no 
error in the t r i a l c o u r t ' s refusal of the defendant's challenge 
for cause as t o t h i s venireman. Prospective juror Opheikens in 
the ins tant case a l so repeatedly affirmed her impart ia l i ty on 
voir dire (R. 452, 541, 542) . Thus, her inc lus ion in the panel 
was not error. 
Prospective juror Opheiken's statements t o the e f f e c t 
that she would want defendant to prove h i s innocence did not 
warrant her excusal for cause because the t r i a l court 
r e h a b i l i t a t e d her. See Bias v- S t a t e . 561 P.2d 523 (Okl. C r . ) , 
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c e r t denied 434 D.S. 940, 98 S.Ct. 432, 54 L.Ed.2d 300 (1977) 
(statements by veniremen t o e f f e c t that defendant's innocence 
must be proved did not require d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n for cause where 
each a l s o subsequently indicated they would fol low the cour t ' s 
i n s t r u c t i o n s and presume defendant innocent unt i l proven g u i l t y ) . 
Prospect ive juror Shepherd's acquaintance with the 
v i c t i m ' s s i s t e r - i n - l a w a l s o did not warrant d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n for 
cause because she s ta ted she could judge the matter s o l e l y on the 
evidence presented a t t r i a l (R. 524-525) . in State v . Bashor. 
614 P.2d 470, 477-478 (Mont. 1980) , the court found no error in 
the t r i a l c o u r t ' s refusal to exclude for cause a prospect ive 
juror who was the dance ins tructor of the homicide v i c t i m ' s 
daughter, even though the prospect ive juror i n i t i a l l y s ta ted she 
could not be a f a i r juror , because she l a t e r s ta ted that she 
could f a i r l y decide the matter on the evidence adduced at t r i a l . 
Also , in S ta te V. Gilbertr 100 N.M. 392, 671 P.2d 640, ££r±. 
denied. 104 S.Ct. 1429 (1983) , the court found no error in the 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s refusal to excuse for cause a venireman who worked 
with the defendant's former fa ther - in - law. 
The f a c t s of State v- Hewitt. Utah, 689 P.2d 22 (1984), 
and State v- Brooks. Utah, 563 P.2d 799 .(1977), c i t e d by 
defendant, are d i s t ingu i shab le from the f a c t s of t h i s case . In 
Hewitt , t h i s Court ruled that the t r i a l court erred in not 
excusing for cause a venireman who would c r e d i t a p o l i c e 
o f f i c e r ' s testimony t o an undue ex tent . This venireman a l s o 
s t a t e d : "In es sence , I would prefer not to be here." I d . a t 26. 
In the present case , neither Ms. Opheikens nor Ms. Shepherd 
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suggested that they would cred i t the testimony of any witness to 
an undue ex tent . Ms. Shepherd's statement to the e f f e c t that she 
would prefer not to serve on the jury was alone i n s u f f i c i e n t to 
warrant her d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n for cause. This Court in Hewitt did 
not base i t s rul ing in any respect on the s imilar statement of 
the improperly retained venireman in that case . 
Significantly, another venireman in Hewitt was held to 
have been properly retained in the panel because his statement 
that he could be fair and impartial was not eroded by additional 
testimonial facts. 689 P.2d at 26. Similarly, in this case, the 
statements of prospective jurors Opheikens and Shepherd regarding 
their ability to be impartial were not eroded by other testimony 
or facts. 
In Brooks . t h i s Court held that the t r i a l court abused 
i t s d i s c r e t i o n in denying the defendant's chal lenge for cause as 
to two prospect ive jurors who had developed a r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
"af fec t ion , respect , or esteem11 with two "important" State 
w i t n e s s e s . 563 P.2d a t 802. In the ins tant case , prospect ive 
juror Shepherd did not know any of the wi tnesses at defendant's 
t r i a l , and prospect ive juror Opheikens was merely acquainted with 
S t a t e ' s wi tness Earl Chapman. The record would not support a 
f inding that Ms. Opheiken had a r e l a t i o n s h i p of "af fect ion , 
re spec t , or esteem" with Mr. Chapman. Furthermore, as previously 
noted, Mr. Chapman's testimony was not crucia l to the S t a t e ' s 
case . 
Therefore, the t r i a l court properly exerc ised i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n in refusing defendant's chal lenge for cause as to Ms. 
Opheikens and Ms. Shepherd. Thus, there was no error . 
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POINT I I I 
THE PROSECUTOR'S ARGUMENT WAS PROPER. 
Defendant a l l e g e s as error the prosecutor ' s arguing 
that defendant "faked" mental i l l n e s s . Defendant a l s o a l l e g e s as 
error the prosecutor ' s references during summation t o harassment 
charges against defendant in connection with h i s post-breakup 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with Beverly . [£££ Addendum, Appendix "C."] 
Defendant did not object a t t r i a l t o the prosecutor 's 
c l o s i n g argument. Thus, he i s precluded from now ra i s ing t h i s 
chal lenge for the f i r s t time on appeal absent fundamental error . 
S ta te Y, Linden, 136 Ariz . 129, 664 P.2d 673 (Ariz. App. 1983); 
V i g i l V, Statftf 666 P.2d 1293 (Okl. Cr. 1983); £ f . S ta te v. 
Xald££, 30 Utah 2d 54 , 513 P.2d 422 (1973) . 
The a l l eged errors in prosecutor 's c l o s i n g argument do 
not constitute fundamental error. Counsel for both sides have 
considerable latitude in their arguments to the jury in 
expressing their views of the evidence, and each has the right, 
even the duty, to discuss and analyze all aspects of the 
evidence, including the inferences and deductions arising 
therefrom. State v. Wells, Utah, 603 P.2d 810 (1979); State v. 
Kazdar Utah, 540 P.2d 949 (1975); State v. Valdez. 513 P.2d at 
426. This Court in Jfcaldez. set forth the standard of review for 
remarks of counsel: 
The test of whether the remarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit 
reversal in a criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in determining 
their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, 
probably influenced by those remarks. 
-24-
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(quoted i n S t a t e v . Troy, Utah, 688 P.2d 483 , 486 
(1984) ) . Nei ther prong of t h e Valdez t e s t i s s a t i s f i e d ii the 
i n s t a n t c a s e . 
The cha l lenged remarks " the p rosecu tor did not c a l l 
t'.lie j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n • m a t t e r s tha JLL WUL 
conside1 e r d i c t . Defendant himself 
e] i c i t e d the tes t imony h i s h i s t o r y * nental i l l n e s s a s wel l 
as tes t imony r e l a t i n • 
— , * .160-117. 
1188, 1212-1216, 1220-122: 7-1338, 1344 c r o s s -
e x ami na t i o n,, ::I ef e n da * * . a 
verified that police officers had been called * :casions in 
connection with incidents threats and 
d e f e n d a 1iL a 11c1 B t „i v e r, "I y (I - ;h al 1 en ge d 
arguments of the p rosecu to r d id not go beyond the scope of the 
evidence .* pe rmi s s ib ly expressed h i s analysi/-. ul thr e\ Idence 
a II J t IK deduc t ions a r i s i n g theref rom. Moreover, 
a s t h e record c l e a r l y r e v e a l s , t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment nil flu 
harassment charges wa*". n iit v ndcjrl in M luir ui I ensc c o u n s e l ' s 
a s se r t i oi I t h a t defendant had been a c q u i t t e d of those cha rges . 
r.£££ Addendum, Appendix 
Even <* wPfP improper, 
il i s n/ warranted because under the c i rcumstances of t h i s 
case the r . reasonable l i k e l i h o o d t h a t I IK MMV WHS 
influe^ rendant c i t e s S t a t e v . Troy. Utah, 
688 P.2d 483 (1984) , i n suppor t * r the p r o p o s i t i o n tha* a case 
wi th l e s s than compell ing proof, l ihood 
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that improper remarks w i l l inf luence the jury. Howeverf contrary 
t o defendant's a s s e r t i o n on appealr the evidence of defendant's 
g u i l t was not s u s c e p t i b l e of d i f f e r i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s such that 
the prosecutor ' s arguments below require heightened scrut iny 
under Troy. 
Defendant claims that the evidence adduced below was 
comprised s o l e l y of c o n f l i c t i n g testimony; howeverr there was 
subs tant ia l agreement as t o many material f a c t s . The evidence 
presented and agreed to by both p a r t i e s e s tab l i shed the 
fo l lowing: defendant l i v e d with Beverly unt i l she kicked him out 
for good in October of 1982; short ly thereaf ter Beverly met and 
began dating Kim Chapman; the po l i ce were c a l l e d s i x t imes 
regarding threats and v i o l e n c e involving defendant and Beverly; 
defendant fol lowed Beverly and watched the Chapman house; 
defendant broke i n t o Bever ly ' s house the night of March 10 , 1983 
and angr i ly waited for Beverly to return home in the morning; 
defendant broke in to the Chapman home the night of March 11 , 1983 
and hid in the basement storage room for forty minutes before 
confronting Beverly and Kim; defendant ordered Beverly to t i e up 
Kim but she was unable to do so; when defendant l e f t , Kim was 
dead and Beverly was wounded; andf f i n a l l y , defendant t o l d 
Officer Terry Shaw only an hour l a t e r that he be l i eved he had 
hurt or k i l l e d someone. 
Furthermore, the c o n f l i c t s in the testimony did not 
g ive r i s e t o a reasonable inference of defendant's innocence. 
Defendant and defendant's w i tnes se s t e s t i f i e d , contrary to 
Bever ly ' s testimony, that after kicking defendant out of her 
- 2 6 -
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h o u s e r B e v e r l y i f-prd! tvl! <,/ Win ' defendant she loved him only 
I: :> immediately thereafter r e j e c t again
 ; , Beverly 
f launted her r e l a t i o n s h i p with , 
II 1 iMi i" 11,1111 MMI) , LvtMi ill the jury be l ieved t h i s testimony, such 
testimony tended only to reinforce the inference from the other 
evidence that defendant w :. iviHeii "almi'iy in k i l l K m 
Chapman attempt t o . Beverly. 
Also, defendant claimed that the murder weapon was a 
gun h e had q i i en Rpver l^ , «• ti,j i K I HI Huddnnj^ p r o d u c e d t h e gun 
immediately after defendant turned h i s back, and that after the 
gun discharged four times acc identa l l y dur ing d .st; i m,)i| I >.:, the quri 
1 * l,:), 13 0 8 , 1 i I '», 
1350-135 4 . gun was found a * * murder scene (R. 
663-664, 1501, 1504) , .^*nf 
n x.: the gun with him of the Chapmans' basement 
but a l s o that -•• had taken the gun -... *^^* x*i.m and purposefully 
useu i t tu 
F ina l ly , defendant's account r "* - ! icident was 
contradicted by more than j u s t Beverj " -- HIJ.Acting t e s t imuny . 
The inves t iga t a s t r u g g l e \ R • b'"«7, 
682) , Defendant's swe statements d i f f ered mater ia l ly from h i s 
testimony at t r i a l " r '17, 734-737
 P 1 4 M - I 4 h h i PMH1 I,he -. 
p a t h < f t in- p a t t e r n of; sp la t tered blood be l ied 
defendant's vers ion shootings I R 676-67 7f 808-810, 815, 
819, 822, 1410-1416, 1461-146 
evidence was not so c lose that any a l leged 
improper remark in the prosecutor 's c lo s ing argument could have 
- 9 7 -
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unduly inf luenced the jury. Therefore, defendant's conv ic t ions 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons respondent seeks affirmance 
of defendant's convic t ions below. 
DATED t h i s J2//L . day of Apri l , 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
^m^^^9f^ 
/ / S A N D R A ^TSKKREN 
Ass i s tant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Max D. 
Wheeler, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, 10 Exchange Place, 11th 
Floor, P.O. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110; and Craig S. 
Cook, 3645 East 3100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109, attorneys 
for appellant, this day of April, 1985. 
^^^K^f^^ 
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APPENDIX "A" 
True and exact copies of Instructions Nos. 
13, 14, 17, 22 and 24, challenged on appeal by defendant, 
are incorporated herein as Appendix "A." 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree 
if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of 
another under any of the following circumstances: 
The actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a 
person other than the victim and the actor; or 
The homicide was committed while the actor was engaged 
in the commission off or an attempt to commitf or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit * * * aggravated burglary or 
burglary * * *. 
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,n V^CA 
INSTRUCTION NO. 'j \ \ ) 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, a capital offense, you must find from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of that crime: 
1. The defendant, Robert E. Jones, 
2. intentionally or knowingly 
3* caused the death of Kim Chapman, 
4. and at the time of said homicide, the 
defendant 
• 
a) created a great risk of death to a 
person other than the victim and the 
defendant; 
or, 
b) the homicide was committed while the 
defendant was engaged in 
1) the commission of, 
or, 
2) an attempt to commit, 
or, 
3) flight after committing or attempting 
to commit 
an aggravated burglary or burglary. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and 
L of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
ibt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other 
d, if the evidence has failed to so establish one of more of 
3 elements, then you should find the defendant n^ *- —--•-• 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE/ Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree 
felony/ you must find from the evidence/ beyond a reasonable 
doubt/ all of the following elements of that crime: 
1. The defendant/ Robert E. Jonesf 
2. intentionally or knowingly 
3. caused the death of Kim Chapman/ 
orf 
1. That the defendant/ Robert E. Jonesf 
2. acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human lifef 
3. recklessly engaged in conduct which creates 
a grave risk of death to another (Kim 
Chapman) 
4. and thereby caused the death of another 
(Kim Chapman)• 
orf 
1. The homicide was committed while the 
defendant was engaged in 
a) the commission of/ 
orf 
b) an attempt to commit/ 
or/ 
c) flight after committing or attempting 
to commit 
an aggravated burglary or burglary. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and 
all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt/ it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other 
hand/ if the evident h»e *•-•*•--»*--
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INSTRUCTION NO. £ 2 ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of 
ATTEMPTED MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a first degree felony, you 
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of 
the following elements of that crime: 
1. The defendant, Robert E. Jones, 
2. intentionally or knowingly 
3. attempted to cause the death of Beverly 
Jones, 
4. and at the time of said attempted homicide, 
the defendant 
a) created a great risk of death to a 
person other than the victim and the 
defendant; 
or, 
b) the attempted homicide was committed 
while the defendant was engaged in 
1) the commission of, 
or, 
2) an attempt to commit, 
or, 
3) flight after committing, or attempting 
to commit 
an aggravated burglary or burglary. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and 
all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other 
hand, if the evidence has failed to so establish one of more of 
said elements, then you should find the defendant not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. *H 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of 
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, Attempted Murder in the Second 
Degree, a second degree felony, you must find from the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that 
crime: 
1. The defendant, Robert E. Jones, 
2. intentionally or knowingly 
3. attempted to cause the death of Beverly 
Jones, 
or, 
1. That the defendant, Robert E. Jones, 
2. acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life, 
3. recklessly engaged in conduct which creates 
a grave risk of death to another (Beverly 
Jones) 
4. and thereby attempted to cause the death of 
another (Beverly Jones). 
or, 
1. The attempted homicide was committed while 
the defendant was engaged in 
a) the commission of, 
or, 
b) an attempt to commit, 
or, 
c) flight after committing or attempting 
to commit 
an aggravated burglary or burglary. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and 
all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX "B" 
A true and exact copy of the transcript of the 
proceedings relating to the voir dire of potential jurors 
Kathy Opheikens and Barbara Shepherd (R. 451-452, 522-530, 
537-549, 570-571) is incorporated herein as Appendix "B." 
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what he is here for, to present the client's case. He 
himself is not the client. 
• PROSPECTIVE JUROR: It wouldn't in my case. 
THE COURT: How about you? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hughes, would you read the list 
of your supposed witnesses? 
I am going to ask you to listen to those names. Just 
listen to them, please. 
MR. HUGHES: Earl Chapman, father of the deceased 
Beverly Jones, one of the victims. Officer Rudy Van Beekum, 
Ogden City police officer. Terry Shaw, V/eber County deputy. 
Norm Soakai, Ogden City detective. Dr. Monique Ryser, State 
medical examiner's office. Officer Gale Bowcutt, Ogden City 
police officer. Nathan Webster, Orden City police officer. 
James Gaskill, Weber College Crime Lab, and Dr. James Wellman 
THE COURT: Any of you acquainted with any of 
these individuals? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I know^  the father. 
THE COURT: Can you tell me just the nature of 
your acquaintance? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: We lived at lc^8 - 40th. 1 
grew up and went to school with the children. 
THE COURT: Have you discussed this matter with 
him at all? 
EVELYN STOOOC r* e n 
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'PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Just at the viewing. 
-. THE COURT: Do you feel the relationship is close 
enough that it would interfere with your impartialty in 
this matter? 
A. Well, I havenft lived there for several years. 
I do know the family. 
Q You just are acquainted with him? 
A. Yes, went to school with their daughters. 
Q You can still try the case on the merits of 
what's here, and render a verdict, and set aside any outside 
information and acquaintance? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Probably. 
THE COURT: It wouldn't bother you? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No. 
THE COURT: Any of the rest of you? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I donft know the girl, but 
my daughter-in-law works with her. I have heard her side. 
THE COURT: Well, we will go into that phase of 
it a little later; okay? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Okay. 
THE COURT: Normally we pick out jurors In a 
panel. In this particular case we are going to do a lot of 
interviewing individually. We can shorten the time. 
The ones that are actually picked as tria] jurors are 
in effect picked by counsel. They like to know a little 
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THE COURT: Call Barbara Sheppard. 
(Prospective juror Sheppard is called from the 
hall by the bailiff) 
BY MR. HUGHES: 
Q . Mrs.Sheppard, I need to ask you some questions 
A. Okay 
Q, This is a case as th? jud^s has told you 
involving a charge of murder in the first decree. Because 
of the seriousness of that we do things differently, 
talking; to you individually. It also involves the possibilit 
of a death penalty. 
In Utah a jury can actually be the body that imposes 
sentence. I need to find out a little bit about 
your feelings about the death penalty. 
Can you tell me in general how you view that? 
A. I really don't know how to answer it. 
Q. Let me pose some questions. 
The way this trial works is that there are two phases 
to it. The first part is a guilt* phase. You are asked to 
determine whether or not Mr. Jones did in fact do the things 
he is eharged with. The jury will be asked to hear the 
evidence, and if the jury found there was proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he had in fact murdered somebody, 
committed murder in the first degree, you would be asked to 
return a verdict of guilty. 
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x If the jury does do that, there would be a second 
phase, a penalty phase, in which the jury would be asked to 
determine sentence. The choice of the sentence would be 
between life imprisonment and the death penalty. I)c you feel 
that there are certain times or certain circumstances in 
which the death penalty is appropriate punishment for people? 
A. I would say yes. 
Q. Is it something that should be selectively 
imposed? 
A. I don't know. I have to be truthful. I don't, 
know. 
Q. There is two parts to the responsibility of 
these kinds of cases. The judge determines what the law is. 
The jury's responsibility is to determine the facts and 
apply the law to those facts. 
If the judge were to tell you that the penalty phase-
was simply that if you found the aggravating factors outweigh 
the mitigating factors involved, the things that might 
tend to excuse or lessen the guilt, of Mr. Jones, that you 
should then impose the death penalty if you felt that 
standard was met, and that the evidence showed that, can 
you vote for the death penalty? 
A. I think so. 
MR. HUGHES: 1 don't have any more ouestions. 
BY MR. CAINE: 
QL Mrs. oheppard, J take it th;-n that you would not 
p-wr->i wfc.i f*^ str* •-» «•» +s #•» »•% 
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impose the death penalty in every case where a killing was 
involved or a shooting? 
A. I guess it would depend on the circumstances. 
Q There is nothing in your background, either of a 
religious faith or moral or ethical code, that requires blood 
atonement, eye for an eye, and that if the life is taken 
there should be retribution? 
A. No, sir. 
Q You do understand that each case is different, 
and the presumption is that a person would be given life 
imprisonment unless you found the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed everything else? 
A. Yes. 
Q You feel you could follow the law on that? 
A. Yes. 
Q All right. I am interested in what you may 
know about this case, either from what you have read in the 
newspaper back in March when it happened, or recently in the 
newspaper or television. Do you know anything about it 
at all? 
A. I have read it in the newspaper. I have followed 
it, and the reason for it is because I work with the 
deceased, Kim Chapman1s,sister-in-law. 
Q. The deceased, Kim Chapman's, sister-in-law? 
A. Yes. His brother's wife. 
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Q Have you discussed the case with her? 
A. No. 
Q, She has not purported to give you any facts or 
information about the case-? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You just did it because you were interested 
because you knew this person? 
A. And there were comments out where I work,and 
people was following it through because we do work with Chcry 
Q, Okay. Are there some specific facts tha~ you 
can recall that you feel were there now, and that you 
won't be able to remove from your mind and judge the case 
only on what you hear in the courtroom? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q In other words, what may happen here, there may 
be facts proven to you here that were different from what 
you know, or they may be the same. We don't know. You will 
have to put aside anything you may have read or heard or 
discussed , but look at only the evidence that comes in 
here. 
Do you think you will be able to do that given what's 
gone on out at work? 
A. I hope so. 
Q Well, you think there is a problem there in 
terms of at least the interest that has been generated by the 
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- Q A l l r i g h t . Ycu d o n ' t know any of t h e v i c t i m s 
s p e c i f i c a l l y ? 
A. No, s i r . 
Q, You don't know Kim Chapman? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. All right. Have you followed any of the other 
cases that we have had recently here, the Pocco and Hanson 
trials, in the paper, and that sort of thing? 
A. Yes, 1 have read them in the paper. 
Q, You are aware of the jury's verdict in the Hanson 
case and the sentence that was imposed this last week? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q Anything about that that bothers ycu? 
A. No, sir. 
Q You felt all right about that? 
A. Yes. 
Q, Let me ask you this. 1? you have ever read 
the book, The Executioner's SonR, or the Victim that is out 
about the Hi Fi case? 
A. No, sir, 
Q, Have you seen the movie that is out called The 
Star Chamber? 
A. No, sir. 
EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R. 
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A. . Nc, sir. 
Q, This case will involve evidence about the use of 
a handgun, a .38 Saturday Night Special. Do 
you have strong feelings about gun control or the ownership 
of that kind of weapon that may have an impact on your 
decision? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q You seem to be concerned about that. Is there 
anything about that? Have you had experience with a gun, a 
bad or good experience, that bothered you? 
A. I am just frightened of guns. 
Q. Do you and your husband own a weapon of any 
kind? 
A. My husband has a hunting rifle, but it is way up 
in the rafters because I am so afraid of it, 
Q. You don't quarrel with people if they have them? 
As far as a person being able to own one, you don't have 
any difficulty with that? 
A. No, sir. 
Q, There will also be some other things in the case 
that may or may not be unpleasant. One is there will be some 
photographs introduced that show a deceased individual who 
has been shot, Mr. Chapman, and rather explicit testimony 
about sexual relations between people who are not married. 
Do you feel that you will be so sensitive tc those kind]: 
EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R. 
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1 of things tha t you wil l not be able to concentrate on the 
evidence? 
A. I would probably be very sensitive to most of 
those, yes. 
Q What I am interested in. There obviously are 
none of us that like to look at that sort of thing. Would 
the mere fact there are such photos be so overwhelming that 
you wouldn't be able to pay attention to the rest of the 
evidence? 
A. I don't think so. It is hard for me to answer 
yes or no. 
Q And the judge is sensitive to these things. 
Obviously he is not going to allow things to come in that 
were of such a naturethat they would upset anyone. But the 
very nature of the case requires that sometimes the jury 
view these things. I am concerned if you would be able to 
look at it, view these things, and look at photographs. I 
am particularly concerned with how you view these things 
because of your involvement out at work? 
A. Now that would be hard, because T see Cheryl 
every day. It 'would be hard. Let's put it that way. 
Q, With the exception of knowing Cheryl, has there 
ever been anyone close to you or a member of your immediate 
family, related, that has been the victim of a serious crime, 
or been involved in a shooting, robbery, or burglary, anything 
r \ / e i \/kJ e-T"/Mar»e /-» e ra 
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A. No, sir. 
Q You have not served on a jury before; is that 
right? 
A. No, sir. 
Q Have you ever had experience of having to get 
together with a group of people and discussing a particular 
problem to arrive at a solution on a certain course of 
action, or make a decision on something where ycu collective!^ 
got together and made a judgment? Have you had that 
experience? 
A. No, sir. 
Q Are you a person that is able to express your 
opinions if you feel strongly about something? Are you 
that way, or are you intimidated easily? 
A. If 1 feel strongly, I think I could. 
Q, If you were in a situation where if you looked 
at something one way, and eleven other people looked one 
way, and you felt opposite, do you think you might be able 
to withstand any pressure that might be brought against your 
mind? 
A. If I felt very strongly about it. 
Q Okay. Good. Is there anything that you haven't 
told us about, either of a physical nature or any other 
problem, that if the case went a week and you had to sit 
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1 here and listen to the evidence, it might prevent ycu from 
2II giving your full attention to what was going on here in the 
courtroom? 
A. No, sir. 
Q, Even though you have had this association out to 
work, do you think that you can sort of put that aside, or 
would you feel like ycu have to go back and answer to this 
gal, depending on that your situation is, or' explain to her 
why you did what you did? 
A. I would hope not, but I do see her every day. 
Q You would really like not to serve on this jury; 
is that a fair statement? 
A. That is a fair statement, 
MR. CAJNE: That's all the questions I have, 
Your Honor. 
MR. HUGHES: Pass for cause. 
MR. CAINE: I'll make the challenge. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Shenpard, I'm going to excuse 
you until 1:30. We hope at that time to have sufficient 
number collected that we will get the twelve who sill sit as 
jurors.-
In the meantime, don't discuss the case with anyone. 
Do not form or express any opinion. Keep your mind open. 
A. Am I excused from work from the time I go to 
l:'-!0? 
F V / C T I V W C T A B B C 
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Q Okay. Do you have any physical or any other kind 
of problem that if this case went a week to try that might 
prevent you from devoting your full attention to the evidence 
A. No, sir, except I have got a vacation coming up, 
but that shouldn't hurt. 
Q, When is your vacation? 
A. The second week in September. 
Q, Okay. We won't be that long. 
Other than that, you don't have any problems? 
A. No real problems. 
MR. CAINE: That is all I have. 
MR. HUGHES: I would pass for cause. 
MR. CAINE: Pass for cause. 
THE COURT: I am going to excuse you until 1:30. 
By that time we hope to have the sufficient number that we 
will be able to pick the twelve that will sit as the trial 
J ury. 
In the meantime, you are not. to discuss the case with 
anyone. Do not form or express any opinion in regard to it. 
Keep your mind open, and be back at 1:30. 
A. Yes, Your Honor. 
(Prospective juror Wolthuis was excused) 
THE COURT: Kathy Onheikens? 
(Prospective juror Onheikens is called from the 
hall by the bailiff) 
•?»%#»— • wm.i 
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BY MR. HUGHES: 
Q I n e e d t o a s k you some q u e s t i o n s . . 
A. Okay . 
Q As the judge has indicated to you, this is a case 
involving a charge of murder in the first degree. As a 
possible sentence in that kind of charge, there is the 
possibility of the death penalty. I need to inquire of you 
generally your feelings about the death penalty. 
Bo you think that is something that society should have 
available to it to impose in certain kinds of cases? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q In this kind of case there is two parts to it. 
The first part is a guilt phase to determine whether or not 
Mr. Jones had in fact done the things that he is accused 
of. If the jury finds that he is guilty of murder in the 
first degree, then will be the second hearing in which the 
jury will be asked to impose sentence. 
The choice on the sentence would be life Imprisonment 
or the death penalty. The judge would instruct the jury as 
to what the law is in the State of Utah, that every defendant 
is presumed to have the right to life sentence unless the 
prosecutor, myself, can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the aggravating factors, things that would tend to make the 
crime worse, outweigh the mitigating factors, things that 
might tend to excuse or lessen the crime. 
F V P I V M C T f t D D C f c a 
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If you found that the aggravating factors did outweigh 
the mitigating factors, and you felt that the death penalty 
was appropriate, can you actually impose it? 
A. No. 
Q If you feel that the case was one which didn't 
justify that kind of a sentence? I know some people have a 
hard time with having to make a great decision, one that is 
a momentous decision, deciding such a decision. The jury 
will be making that, and even though they know what is right, 
what they should do, they can't make that kind of decision. 
Are you telling me that you are in that kind of 
situation? 
A. Yes. I would have to listen to that case. 
Q, Is there any kind of circumstances that you 
could find the death penalty appropriate? 
A. There has been some. 
Q. So it isnft in every case that you couldn't? 
A. No, sir. 
ft If the evidence is sufficient, you could vote 
for the death penalty? 
A. Yes, sir. 
MR. HUGHES: That is all I have. 
BY MR. CAINE: 
Q, Mrs. Cpheikens, you say there are some cases, 
where you could have found it. You have not served on a 
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, had to make that kind of decision actually 
have you? 
Uh-uh. 
Tell me actually what kind of case would be 
o 
I work for the hospital, so I am in contact 
with Dr. Naisbitt. One case would be the Hi Pi case. 
Q You couldn't disagree with the decision the 




You don't believe that it should be applied in 




read in the 
No, I don't agree that it should in all cases. 
All right. Let me ask you if you know anything 
particular case, either something you may have 
paper back in March when it happened, or recently 










Well, I know the family, the Chapman family. 
Okay. Tell me about how you know them? 
Well, I went to school with the kids. T lived a 
them. 
That was, I think you said, for about fifteen 
Eighteen years. 
You would be older or younger than Kim? 
Older. He went to school with my sister. 
EVELYN STORRS. C.S.R. 
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ft There was a fairly close family relationship 
between your family and theirs; is that a fair stateminent? 
A. Well, it depends, you know. We associated with 
one another. 
ft Have you discussed the case with members cf the 
Chapman family since this happened? 
A. At the viewing. 
ft That would have been with Mr. Chapman? 
A. And the oldest sister. 
ft So were you told about what happened by them or 
at least discussed it? 
A. Well, she just said how hard it was, and how 
the basement was in a mess, and they had to hire people to 
come in and clean it up, things like that. 
ft Do you feel that given that close association 
and talking with them, also knowing that Mr. Chaoman would 
1 be a witness in this case, that there may be a problem in 
you viewing this fairly with an open mind in terms cf looking 
at the evidence that is presented? 
A. I think I could view it fairly. 
ft You havenTt made up your mind or have any 
preconceived idea about how it happened, in terms of being 
able to put that aside? 
A. No, I don!t have the details
 ? what exactly 
happened. 
1 EVELYN STORRS. C.S.R. 
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A. No3 sir. 
Q, Or what went on? 
A. No. 
Q There is no bitterness or feeling that way 
because the family was involved on your part you feel might 
carry over into the trial? 
A. No. 
Q Okay. Would you feel like if you made a 
decision one way or the other that you would have to explain 
it either to the sister or other members of the Chapman 
family after you got done? Do you feel you would be 
compelled to do that because of your association with them? 
A. That would be hard to say. 
0/ Particularly if it was a decision that either Mr. 
Jones wasn't guilty or he wasn't given the death penalty, or 
anything of that nature, that would be tough? 
A. Yes, that would be hard, I think. 
Q Do you still see the sisters? 
A. One lives in California now. 
Q Other than going "co the viewing, do you have 
any direct contact with the family? 
A. No. 
ft Let me ask you a little bit about other matters. 
The case as you may or may not know involves evidence 
about the use of a handgun, a .38, some people call a 
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Saturday Night Special. 
Do you have some strong feelings about the ownership 
of that kind of gun, or gun control? 
A. No, sir. 
, Q Have you ever owned a gun yourself? 
A. Uh-uh. 
ft So you don't have any problem with that? There 
will be also some photographs introduced that show Mr. 
Chapman dead, the victim shot. Also, there will be some 
very explicit sexual testimony that will come in. Do you 
think that will bother you to the extent that you won't 
be able to listen or give your full attention to the rest of 
the testimony? 
A. No, I see it every day. 
Q At your work? 
A. Yes. 
Q Were you involved at all when Beverly Jones was 
up at the hospital? You work at St. Benedicts? 
A. I work part time there and part time at a 
medical lab on ?5th. 
Q. You haven't any involvement with her when she 
was there? 
A. No, sir. 
Q Let me ask you if you ever read the book, The 
Executioner's Song, or Victim, that is out about the Hi Fi 
case? 
EVELYN STORRS. C.S.R. 
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A. I haven't read the book, Victim. There was a 
girl at work that read it and relayed it. 
Q There is a movie out now called The Star Chamber, 
Have you seen it? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q I don't believe you have ever served on a jury 
before; is that correct? 
A. No, sir. 
Q What I am interested in, have you ever had to 
sit down with a group of people, either at your work or 
church, or at your home, and had to discuss a matter and 
make a decision, and come to an agreement of some sort to 
follow a course of action based on that? Have you ever done 
that or had that experience? 
A. Definitely. 
ft Are you. a person that can express your opinion 
and you feel comfortable in doing that in a group, say it 
was against the group? 
Well, let's assume it is a group of people that you 
don't know? 
A. Sometimes it is hard. 
Q Okay. You feel strongly about something, are 
you able to express yourself? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q You feel like if you are in a group of eleven 
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people, twelve people, and you felt very strongly about a 
particular point, and everybody else felt just the opposite, 
that you can express your opinion and stay with it even if 
it meant incurring the wrath of all the others? 
A. I think so. 
Q You could do that? 
A. (nods head up and down) 
Q Is there anything of a personal nature or 
a physical nature that might prevent you if this case went 
a week from sitting on the jury and devoting full attention 
to the case, anything that would be bothering you that we 
donTt know about? 
A. No. 
Q All right. I am still a little concerned. I 
donTt know frankly what else to ask you about your associati 
with the folks that are involved in this case. 
Do you feel like given everything that you know about 
them, the Chapman family and your connection with them, 
that you can really give Mr. Jones here the presumption of 
innocence that he is entitled to at this stage of the 
proceedings? 
In other words, the judge will tell you that even 
though he is charged, even though he has been in the system 
here in a trial, that he is entitled to the presumption of 
innocence and that doesnTt change until the State has to 
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1 prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He is not 
2 required to prove his own innocence. 
You feel that given all of this that you can accord 
him that constitutional right? 
A. I think so. 
Q You feel that you wouldn't be looking; to him to 
prove his own innocence to you by what you know and based 
on your connection with the family? Do you feel that you 
would not be affected, requiring him to prove himself 
innocent to you based upon what you know about it and the 
connection with family, and that sort of thing? 
A. I would think I would want him to prove himself 
innocent. 
Q Okay. You understand that in the law that is 
not the way the system works. The way it works is that Mr. 
Hughes over here has to prove him guilty. What I am 
concerned about, if you already think that he is a little 
bit guilty based on what you know, if you are going to be 
able to accept,or if you are going to be expecting Mr, 
Jones to prove his own innocence to you? 
A. With what I know, I would have to have him 
prove his innocence to me. 
MR. CAINE: AH right. That's a]l I have. 
BY THE COURT: 
ft Let me inquire a little in that regard. Now 
EVELYN STORRS. C.S.R. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 





















X perhaps it is a play on words, and perhaps it is your honest 
2II feeling in regard to it. 
You understand that under the law in this country a 
defendant doesn't have to prove anything. The burden is 
always upon the State to prove guilt. This is a protection 
that is given to individuals. You will be so 
instructed that a-defendant is presumed to be innocent unless 
and until the State proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
That means that beyond a reasonable doubt to which you can 
attach a reasonable reason. 
That is the law, and you will be so instructed. 
If you're-a juror,and if you go into it with a 
preconceived notion from your own knowledge that the defendan 
is guilty, that is not how our system works, whether or not 
the fact that a life has been taken. There are several 
elements to a defense which I will break down for you 
and tell you what they are. But if you go in with it in 
your mind, well, he is guilty and he's got to show me he is 
not, you are not following the law. It is the reverse of 
that. 
A. I understand. 
Q You must accord him the presumption that he is 
23 innocent and look to the State to prove beyond a reasonable 
24|i doubt every element of the offense. Just the fact that he 
25 || is charged doesn't mean a thing. Oftentimes there are what 
FVFI VM CTOODC i- r D 
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we call lesser included offenses that may well be given to 
a jury other than the capital homicide, things of this 
nature. It will depend on what the State proves,what the 
State has to prove. The defendant doesn't. -
You understand? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. All right. With that in mind are you telling 
us that even though that is the law, and even though you 
were instructed, you would still look to the defendant tc 
prove his innocence, or can you follow the law? 
A. No, I will follow the law. 
Q Can you acfiord him that and keep that in mind, 
and when you analyze it look to the State to prove his 
guilt, not him prove his innocence? 
A, No, I will follow the law, 
Q I understand you are very nervous when you sit 
up here and things are asked of you. 
When you say you would look"to him, it may well he just 
the way the thing is put to you. .But if you can follow the 
law and accord him that Drotection that the law gives him, 
then that is all we ask, 
A. Okay. 
Q Okay. Can you do that? 
A. Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: All right. She is qualified. 
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MR. HUGHES: I pass for cause. 
MR. CAINE: I will file an objection, 
THE COURT; All right. I am sure you can do it, 
Mrs. Opheikens. I am going to excuse you until 1:30. By 
that time we should have sufficient number that wo can pick 
the twelve to try the case. 
In the meantime, donTt talk about the case. DonTt 
form or express an opinion, and be back by 1:30, 
(Prospective juror Ophfeikens was excused) 
THE COURT: Is that it? That is the thirty-two. 
The next three will be for the alternates. 
(Prospective juror Elsie Hinckley is called 
from the hall by the bailiff) 
BY MR. HUGHES: 
Q Mrs. Hinckley, I need to ask you some 
questions. 
As the judge has indicated to you, this is a 
case involving a charge of murder in the first degree". 
Because of that, it has a potential penalty of the 
death penalty
 7 so what I would like to do is make inquiry 
about your feelings about the death penalty. 
Do you think that is something that society should 
have available to it in certain kinds of crimes? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q If the judge were to instruct you that there is 
only a limited certain number of cases that the death 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 


























THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. CAINE: The record should show that these 
proceedings are in the judge's chamber preparatory to 
selecting the final jury. That the defendant is present here 
with myself and Mr. Richards. Bernie Allen is also present 
from the Public Defender's Office. Don Hughes is here, and 
Jesse Preston from the sheriffis department is here. 
The first motion we would make, Your Honor, we want the 
record to be clear in case there was any question on the 
objections we raised on the two prospective jurors, Barbara 
Shepherd and Kathy Opheikens. We believe that the court 
should excuse those individuals for cause, particularly with 
Kathy Opheikens. 
I think if you take the overall totality of her 
comments, her acquaintance with the family, the fact that 
they lived next door for fifteen years, the going to school 
with the sisters, everything of that nature, I think in a 
case of this type—obviously, she has expressed the view that 
she hopefully could make a p;ood decision and she wouldn't be 
swayed by that, but in a death penalty case I think the court 
has got to take additional care to insure that all of the 
bases are covered in that kind of a situation. I don't think 
she is entirely without bias on this case. T wouldn't expect 
her to be, frankly, given the circumstances of her association 
EVELYN STORRS r.5 a. 
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with these people. 
1;; 
In regard to Barbara Shepherd, she was the lady that 
2;; 























and it is a.: situation where it had been discussed, how it 
happened, and this kind of thing. And she even felt she 
might have trouble having to go back and explain the 
situation if it was contrary to what everybody thought it 
out to be. Again, it is borderline admittedly, and she 
indicated she would attempt to do the best she could. 
Again, I would urge the court in this kind of a case 
that there is some discretion there that ought to be on the 
side of the defendant on those particular things. We ought 
not to have actually the peremptory challenge. We would 
renew, though, his challenge, also the motion to exclude them 
at this time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hughes? 
MR. HUGHES: I think the court was correct and 
the examination was fair. 
THE COURT: I think so. I think I took them all 
into consideration. No showing of bias on those two. We 
will let it stand. 
MR. CAINE: Okay. Number two. We have brought 
to the court's attention on two other occasions, and this is 
starting to concern me a little frankly, about what goes on 
out in the hall. 
The first time was yesterday, and we brought to your 
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APPENDIX "C" 
A true and exact copy of the transcript of the 
challenged portions of the prosecutor's closing argument 
(R. 1532-1534, 1595, 1604-1606) is incorporated herein 
as Appendix "C." 
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happening is this man's making it up, using his parents, 
using his family, telling this story, telling this kind of 
thing that is going on. This man has a history of that. How 
many times did we hear suicide? I think I finally counted 
eleven. There may have been more than that. I wasn't sure 
how many times he put the shotgun in his mouth. We have at 
least eleven different suicide attempts, and we never once had] 
a serious injury to this man. Confronted with that in the 
jail, he turned blue. That's not the kind of serious injury 
where somebody gets hurt out ot if. It's especially 
convenient when they know that they have got a ten minute 
suicide watch, and you have the officer there. It's a pattern! 
for this man. He gets in trouble. He tries this suicide 
thing, not a serious attempt. When he takes the pills, he 
takes them in front of his friend's house so he can walk in 
and faint on the floor, and he can run up to the hospital ancj 
get his stomach pumped. He doesn't want anything serious to 
happen to him, so he takes a bottle of aspirin in front of 
his mother so she can get his stomach pumped, or he sits 
there with a shotgun in his mouth until his father can make 
a diving lunge to save his life. As Bob said, "He pulled 
the trigger and nothing; happened." Was he really suicidal? 
Were things really happening? Don't you reload and pull the 
trigger again? Don't you attempt again? After eleven times 
most suicide I think you're going to find some success in 
there. 
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Weil,what is happening, this man goes to jail at some 
point or he gets in the army, or he gets in a situation that 
he doesn't like, and he tries the suicide attempt. Well, 
what happend? His family rally around him, and everybody 
forgets the rotten things that he has done or they forget 
why he's in jail and why he's incarcerated in the army, or 
the things that he's doing, and they want to worry about poor 
Bob and they focus on that, and everything is foreg-iven. 
Bob Jones told you what really happens in those hospitalsj 
No doctor has said he's crazy. It takes a few days or a few 
weeks to reach that conclusion. They catch on to his game. 
He's cut lose from the hospital. That's what happened on 
every one of those occasions that he's attempted. He's not 
crazy. That's just plain being mean. 
You look at his history, and he went through a lot of 
that, his family went through a lot of that. This man has 
had more opportunities than most of us here has. He's upset 
because his dad and is mother insisted he go to college 
when he got out of high school, and he didn't want to dc that 
and he got mad when they got him this job on the railroad 
in a management position with the high pay. He doesn't like 
that, and he's mad at them for doing that for him. He ends 
up going to the army, and he doesn't make it there. 
The problem with this fellow is that he gets his way. He 
manipulates people. He has manipulated his family. He's 
E V E L Y N STORRS, C.S.R. 
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used this self abuse, this striking out on himself is a way 
of doing that,, and that's exactly what happened in this case. 
As soon as he was arrested up there at Terry Shaw's house 
and brought down to the /jail, within a matter of a few days 
as he told us, the suicide attempt comes. We see the 
craziness act. We see him sent to the state hospital, and 
we ultimately see the same thing. He's cut loose, and heTs 
not crazy. He's doing this same game again to get off it, 
only this time he's committed the most serious crime that 
you can commit in our society. He's taken the life of 
another human being, 
I'm expecting you not to let him get away with what he's 
done. 
There's some important things as to the actual physical 
act that took place. Mr. Jones told us the story that he had 
a struggle with Kim Chapman in self-defense, that he had to 
do that, that he had—that this gun went off sometime during 
the struggle. That makes no sense at all. Everything 
connects with the physical evidence of that axwnw. 
There were four bullets that were shot. You've p;ot three 
of that that you are goiner to take into the jury room. One 
of them came out of the brain of Kim Chapman, and one of 
them came out of the hand of Beverly Jones, and one of them 
was found on the floor after passing through the body of 
Kim Chapman, and the other one is still in the body of 
Beverly Jones. There were four bullets that were shot. Four Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 





















there's a bullet Inside of her chest. You don't have any 
left over fragment. 
Remember what the witnesses themselves said. What I and 
Mr. Caine say- is not evidence. The only things that we can 
do is try to persuade you of our side. 
Another type of thing. Mr. Caine tells you that Mr. Jone^ 
was acquitted on all these harassment charges, six times he 
was brought into court. That's not what his attorney, Frank 
Wells, said about that. He told you about one acquittal of 
following too close charge, . Other than that, you have not 
heard a single statement even from the defendant Mr. Jones 
that he was acquitted on anything. That doesn't mean he was 
found guilty. That is not what I am trying to imply. What 
I'm telling you is, a lot of those things may even be pending 
because of these other things that have intervened and 
stopped it from going. 
But you did hear evidence from this stand about an 
acquittal. You didn't have that come in. 
The same sort of thing on the calendar. You heard from 
the stand that this stops shortly after February 16th. That'^ 
when that quits. That's the night, or that day following that 
night, that Mr. Jones is arrested on 15th Street after he 
supposedly is leaving the state and gets to Snowville and 
somehow has car trouble and has to come back. That's when 
he was arrested, the same time Beverly Jones told you she 
was unable to have sexual intercourse if she wanted to after 
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she was lying to the neighbor when she said that, and she 
was lying when she told Beverly that. But she does admit 
that's what she told Beverly, that this man, Robert Jones, 
was laying to kill both of them. That's not the only person 
who heard that. 
His first wife who he by chance runs into at the bar 
said he said, "Yeah, I ought to rape the bitch and kill her 
boyfriend." Those are words out of his mouth that he talks 
about. 
That's the kind of a statement that he goes.around makjng. 
On the 16th he tells Beverly when he goes in there that 
he's going to kill her, that he's going to wait there until 
Kim comes, and he's going to kill him too. She takes action. 
She pleads for her life. When she can get out, she moves 
to another house, and lives with the Chapman family. 
She told you she felt safe up there. She didn't know 
that his sister LeeAnn and her boyfriend had been following 
them, locating where they were living, that this man was 
wandering around the hills watching down, living in caves so 
that he could watch where she was going. 
Does that make any sense at all? Even if this man goes 
]to the mountains on those kinds of things, why does he go to 
phe top of 9th Street, two houses away from Earl Chapman's 
bouse and sit there, unless you're sitting there for the 
purpose of watching this home? 


























crazy. He's not crazy in any kind of a legal sense, not the 
kind of sense that he's incompetent, that he did these things 
but of some kind of mental disease. That's not the kind. 
He's not that kind of crazy. 
He is crazy in another sense, though. These are not the 
acts of normal, sane, ordinary people. He's criminally 
responsible, but there's something sick and wrong inside of 
him that makes these things go on. But that is not an 
abolition of his guilt. Maybe that's something that maybe we 
ought to make sure that this man gets just desserts, and 
justice is done in this kind of case. 
There is a game that has been going on. It's not been 
played by Beverly Jones. It's been played by this man 
virtually all of his life, and that's the game that when he 
does despicable rotten things, ending up in jail, ending up 
incarceration in the army or elsewhere, for doing lousy 
rotten things to loved ones, that then he plays this p;ame. 
He goes crazy. He tries the suicide attempt. He gets 
committed for a few days or a few weeks until the doctors 
tell him, "You're not crazy. Get out of here.'T And that's 
what's always happened, and that's the exact same game that 
happened here. 
So when Mr. Caine says he went to the cop's house, I 
think you can infer that he had in his mind exactly what was 
going to happen. That he would stand there, lay on the lawn, 
look up like he's dead and not respond to anybodv. *n^ I.H— Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 


























he gets down to the jail you know what's going to happen. 
The suicide attempt is coming, because he told them about it. 
You heard Webster and the others. So he puts the rope around 
his neck, and he turns blue until they cut him down. 
That's the exact sort of thing that he's done to get out 
of trouble each and every time he's been in it. It's the 
way he deals with life. That's the manipulating person that 
has gotten away with it. He's done it with his family. He 
has done it with his parents. You have heard the kind of 
emotion that he has evoked out of them, and I feel sorryfor 
those people as well that they have to live with that kind 
of behavior. And it's been ongoing. They told you about it 
going back for a long time. 
Mr. Caine would make a big deal that Beverly Jones had to 
know the kind of man he was when he lived with her. 
Look at the evidence. She says until this strange 
behavior last summer started that she loved the man. She 
thought he was good and kind. 
Notice his other marriages. His second marriage lasted 
how long? It lasted about a year. It took her about that 
long to catch on. 
His first wife told us about the same sort of problems. 
[There seems to be a period of time when he can pull it 
jtogether and be a decent human being, and then he starts to 
llose it. 
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